Showing posts with label Washington. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Washington. Show all posts

Saturday, February 22

Washington, Colorado ahead of the curve on pot?

Washington, Colorado ahead of the curve on pot?
Business Week | By Scott Shane, Entrepreneur.com

Marijuana legalization presents some interesting opportunities for investors and entrepreneurs.

Like water finding a path, entrepreneurs will always figure out a way to respond to business opportunities. That's why other states should follow the example of Colorado and Washington and legalize the recreational use of marijuana. Harnessing the power of entrepreneurs is much more productive than fighting it.

On Jan. 1, Colorado legalized the sale of small amounts of marijuana for recreational use. Later this year, Washington will follow suit. Alaska, Arizona, California, D.C. and Oregon may be the next states to permit cannabis businesses.

Cultural attitudes, fairness, economics, and entrepreneurial behavior all point to extension of this trend toward legalization. Much like policy makers were caught flat-footed as American attitudes towards same-sex marriage changed, so too have they missed the shifting views toward the legalization of pot.

According to an October 2013 Gallup Organization poll, 58 percent of Americans now favor legalization of marijuana - a jump of 10 percentage points over the previous year. Many policymakers seem to have missed the memo showing that voters' views on the topic are fundamentally different from the late 1960s, when only one-in-nine Americans favored sanctioning it.

Fairness, too, justifies legalizing cannabis. In the 48 states that do not permit recreational use of marijuana, smoking tobacco, which causes cancer, is legal. By contrast, smoking weed, which is used to treat the symptoms of cancer treatments, is not. Moreover, some experts believe that alcohol, which is legal in virtually all parts of the United States, is more harmful than marijuana, which is illegal in almost all of the country.

Fairness dictates that policymakers either need to play nanny and ban everything that's bad for us - from sugar-laden soda to fat-filled fast food - or they need to allow Americans to make adult decisions about what they want to put in their bodies. Making cigarettes, beer, and whiskey legal, while banning joints and hash brownies, unfairly favors the makers of certain harmful products.

Making pot legal has economic benefits. Policymakers can tax sales of the product - and are doing so relatively heavily. Both Washington and Colorado are charging a 25 percent tax on pot sales, with even higher rates in some municipalities. The non-partisan Tax Foundation estimates that Colorado will bring in nearly $70 million in new taxes, with initial proceeds being used for school construction. Because tax revenues are expected to exceed school building needs, Colorado public officials are already thinking of additional ways to use the tax windfall.

By making pot legal, police can focus their attention on stopping more destructive illegal drugs like cocaine and heroin, which are more likely to cause crime and health problems. That would help financially strapped states. If all states legalized cannabis sales, the reduced drug enforcement costs and higher tax revenues would be worth more than $17 billion to them, a 2010 Cato Institute study revealed.

Legalized pot will also produce public health benefits, Forbes reports. Because alcohol consumption is more harmful to people than marijuana use, but the two are substitutes, legalizing pot will lead customers to shift to the better of the two choices.

Entrepreneurs find and pursue market opportunities wherever they are. Making a business illegal doesn't get rid of the efforts of entrepreneurs to pursue it. Everyone knows that entrepreneurs are selling marijuana for recreational use in all 48 states where it is illegal.

Making a business legal makes it easier for policymakers to tap entrepreneurial efforts to benefit society. Colorado and Washington are using taxes and regulation to channel pot entrepreneurship more productively than other states, where policy makers are wasting resources trying to stop it, and, consequently, driving it underground.

Wednesday, October 9

No Washington, no big deal?

No Washington, no big deal?
| By Jim Jubak

So far, the U.S. government shutdown (and similar political deadlock in Italy) hasn’t rattled the market. Here’s a look at how much calm we can expect before the storm.

So where’s the panic?

The U.S. government has “shut down,” with no formula to end the crisis short of intervention by the ghosts of George Washington and Abe Lincoln.

Next, in two or three weeks, the United States government will hit its debt ceiling limit and nobody is negotiating with anybody to avoid a confrontation with just two likely outcomes:

The first is a default on U.S. government debt that could send global financial markets into chaos;

The second is a U.S. constitutional crisis if President Barack Obama decides to ignore the debt ceiling.

Meanwhile, the Italian coalition government looks likely to fall and the country is likely to, No. 1, violate its promise to reduce its budget deficit this year to 3% or less and, No. 2, continue in a recession that now stretches back to 2011.

And the reaction to this turmoil in the financial markets? On Monday morning, in the first hours of a New York trading session that was the first time that U.S. financial institutions and traders could react to the weekend’s news, the yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury actually fell -- meaning that the bond rose in price -- by 0.01 percentage point to 2.61% as of 9:30 a.m. New York time.

And while stocks were down 2.06% in Tokyo over night, as the trading day moved towards the source of news in Rome and New York, the damage got progressively smaller. Stocks in Milan were down just 1.33% as the trading day there moved toward a close on Monday. At Monday's close in New York, the Standard & Poor’s 500 was off 0.6%. On Tuesday, the major indexes posted gains.

Jim Jubak

That’s panic? Nah, that’s ho hum.

So why are the markets acting so blase? How long might that collective shrug last? And what’s going on under the surface that might suggest a deeper anxiety?

First, the markets don’t think that a shutdown of the U.S. government is a very big deal. Everyone understands that a “shutdown” will leave much of the government operating -- Social Security checks will go out and air traffic controllers will work without pay. As long as the shutdown is of limited duration -- a couple of weeks at the outside -- no big deal.

Second, perverse as it may be, bond traders see a limited shutdown of the U.S. government as a plus for U.S. Treasurys. The theory is that a government shutdown and the resulting reduction in U.S. economic growth pushes off the day when the Federal Reserve will begin to taper off its $85 billion in monthly purchases of Treasurys and mortgage-backed assets. A short shutdown would take the possibility of an October decision to begin a taper off the table and might even push a December taper toward the realm of the unlikely. From this perspective, the recent rally in U.S. Treasurys that has taken the yield on the 10-year Treasury down to 2.59% is a continuation of the post-Sept. 18 rally in Treasurys when the Fed didn’t take action on a taper.

Third, there’s still a large element of denial. More traders seem to believe that whatever bad does happen won’t be in effect for very long. At an extreme, the markets want to deny that the Republican leadership in the House of Representatives won’t decide to let Democrats and a few Republicans pass a clean continuing resolution, or that Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta won’t be able to put together the votes to win a confidence vote in the next few days or that.

(Some background on this less familiar confrontation: Over the weekend in Italy the government of Prime Minister Letta moved to the edge of collapse after allies of Silvio Berlusconi said they planned to quit the coalition government. Berlusconi’s conviction on a criminal charge of tax fraud leaves him open to expulsion from parliament, and Letta has refused to block those proceedings. So far Italian president Giorgio Napolitano hasn’t dissolved parliament or called for new elections, but that seems just a matter of days with Letta saying he plans a confidence vote in parliament on Oct. 1 or 2. Letta’s government would probably lose that vote without the support of Berlusconi’s People of Liberty party. Yields on Italy’s 10-year bond were up 0.13 percentage point last week to 4.42%.)

And, fourth, institutional investors calculate that as long as the turmoil in Washington and Rome doesn’t get too intense or go on for too long, it’s cheaper to hedge bets with derivatives such as credit default swaps on U.S. or Italian debt than to actually liquidate positions. No need to actually sell Treasurys or U.S. stocks if “insurance” in the derivatives market stays cheap enough.

If those are the reasons for the market’s very muted reaction to the current news coming out of Rome and Washington, D.C., then I get this framework for projecting how markets will react going forward.

Duration counts.

The market is currently only pricing in limited damage from a government shutdown in the United States and that some kind of political patch job will emerge in relatively short order in Italy (after considerable pressure from the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission.)

Which, of course, means that a U.S. shutdown that goes on for more than a couple of weeks isn’t priced in. Nor is a shutdown that runs into a bloody battle over raising the debt ceiling. I think global markets will show a much bigger reaction if the shutdown battle looks like it is leading to a heightened likelihood of a confrontation over the debt ceiling that might lead to some measure of a U.S. default. (In the case of Italy, if negotiation fails and the country proceeds to a snap election that produces an even less stable coalition or, worse yet from the point of view of the financial markets, a victory for Berlusconi’s People of Liberty Party after a campaign promising no new taxes, then I think you’ll see the price of Italian bonds fall and yields climb significantly.)

Also key: the price of insurance. At the point where it gets too expensive to buy a derivative to insure against a big move downward, the incentives for selling go up dramatically.

The problem in gauging the cost of credit default swaps on U.S. government debt is that the market is relatively thin. After all who would think they need to buy insurance on the debt of the world’s largest economy and instruments that trade in the world’s deepest market?

Still, on Friday, the price of credit default swaps on U.S. Treasurys had climbed to 32 basis points. That’s the highest since May.

Last time the U.S. markets went through this -- back at the time of last debt ceiling battle in the summer of 2011 -- the price of a credit default swap on U.S. Treasurys climbed to 62 basis points. (That was the highest since the global financial crisis. What it means is that an investor would pay 62,000 euros a year to insure 10 million euros of U.S. Treasurys against a default in the next five years. The contract, equal to $13.5 million, is denominated in euros to offset the impact of a default on the U.S. dollar.)

So you can see that we’re still a good way now at 32 basis points from the 62 basis points of the summer of 2011.

But the price is rising. And not just for U.S. debt. The biggest impact of the turmoil in Washington may fall on developing economies such as India or Indonesia with current account deficits and sagging growth rates. Credit default swaps on Asian debt (outside of Japan), as tracked by the Markit iTrax Asian index, had climbed to 155 basis points as of Monday. That’s the highest level since Sept. 4, and at this level insuring this debt costs about five times as much as insuring U.S. Treasurys against default.

So where do markets go from here?

To a large degree that depends on events in Washington and Rome -- and market interpretation of those events. If these two crises stretch out or worsen, then, duh!, markets will get more nervous. Reaction, I think it’s important to point out, will not be linear. Markets are likely to ignore gradually worsening scenarios with just minor declines until -- wham -- the duration gets scary or the price of insurance goes too high.

A rule of thumb might be that risk of something blowing up in the markets goes up at twice (?) or more (squared?) the actual increase in duration.

And while you’re keeping an eye out for a possible big move in the U.S. or European markets, don’t neglect the effect of these two crises on currencies and emerging stock markets.

The Japanese yen has again emerged as the safe haven of choice. That has sent the yen up and Japanese stocks down. Since the Abe government’s program to stimulate the Japanese economy depends on a weak yen, this move upwards isn’t good news for Tokyo equities. I wouldn’t necessarily sell Japanese stocks here since the bounce back when the yen again weakens is likely to be strong and a big new tax credit goes into effect in Japan on Oct. 1 that gives Japanese investors tax-free profit on $10,100 in capital gains a year as long the invest in equities. My strategy here might be to instead buy on weakness sometime in the next week or two.

Emerging stock markets are likely to be very volatile during the U.S. budget and debt ceiling battles. (Remember that rising fear tends to send money into U.S. Treasurys, even when the United States is the source of the fear.) I would frankly stay out of the most exposed emerging stock markets -- India, Turkey and Indonesia, to name three -- until this mess in the United States has subsided.

Friday, September 20

5 years after the crisis: Blame Washington or Wall Street?

| By Suzanne McGee, The Fiscal Times

Five years after the crisis peaked with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, it is still possible to hear bankers claim that Washington forced them to take risks. That claim simply doesn’t have much merit, however.

It all started with a house and a mortgage.

The first is a hallmark of American society, representing the ideal of home ownership: About two-thirds of our fellow citizens own the house or apartment in which they live, encouraged to do so by factors that include being able to deduct the interest on their mortgage payments. And it is the ready availability of those mortgages that has enabled them to buy those houses in the first place.

When the financial crisis brought the entire system to its knees five years ago, the heart of the problem wasn't some esoteric investment strategy but something fairly basic: poor-quality mortgage loans, repackaged by banks and other institutions in such a way as to temporarily mask their weakness. Banks had always made these subprime loans -- issuing mortgages to borrowers with poor credit quality, or financing purchases of homes for buyers who weren't putting anything down themselves. But that had been a fraction of their business, perhaps 8% of all new mortgages in a year. By 2006, the percentage had grown to 20% nationwide, and was far higher in some parts of the country, even as homeowners were taking on debt they simply couldn't afford.

As all the postmortems take place around the fifth anniversary of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, one of the most significant questions boils down to whether it was the financial institutions that made these loans and then restructured and resold them that should bear the blame for the near-meltdown of the system. Or, as others argue, was the crisis the fault of Washington (a convenient code word for politicians, regulators and their rules)?

One of those on Wall Street now viewed as having been blind to the problems that were taking shape in the mortgage world, former Citigroup (C) CEO Charles Prince, may go down in history for his comment that "as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance." That is, as long as the subprime mortgage lending market was moving along and generating big profits for the industry as a whole, no bank could afford to sit it out and allow all those gains to flow to its rivals.

In the wake of the crisis, however, those who believe the blame for the near-meltdown can be laid at Washington's door seized on Prince's phrase as a way to explain what they think happened. In their view, policies ranging from the Alternative Mortgage Transactions Parity Act (which greatly increased the ranks of lenders allowed to write adjustable-rate, interest-only and other kind of mortgages that became so popular among subprime lenders) to the Community Reinvestment Act (which tried to stop discrimination in lending, but which some argue forced banks to lend to home buyers with poor credit) were responsible for the dramatic increase in subprime loans and the increase in leverage in the years leading up to the crisis. Moreover, they argue, other policies resulted in inadequate regulatory supervision of the institutions taking those risks.

Around the first anniversary of the collapse of Bear Stearns, on St. Patrick's Day of 2009, the issue came up for a formal debate at an event organized by Intelligence Squared U.S. The ranks of those arguing that Washington was more culpable included historian Niall Ferguson, who suggested that if Chuck Prince and his fellow Wall Street CEOs were dancing to the music, "you have to ask yourselves … who was playing the music." It wasn't that Ferguson didn't blame banks, he insisted, just that he and his fellow debaters blame Washington more.

Balderdash.

Five years after the crisis peaked with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the forced merger of Merrill Lynch with Bank of America (BAC), and the near-implosion of many other institutions, it is still possible to hear bankers claim, with straight faces, that Washington forced them to take risks. That claim simply doesn't have much merit, however.

Let's first consider it from a common-sense perspective. How willing are banks to do things that they know in their gut are foolish or ill-conceived simply because the government wants them to? If anything, recent history has shown that they put their self-interest first -- and rightly so. Rock-bottom interest rates haven't sparked a flurry of new lending in the wake of the crisis; burned by the mortgage debacle, banks are guarding against credit risk more than they are abiding by the government's clear interest in seeing lending rise in order to fuel economic growth.

Historically, when banks haven't wanted to comply with a government rule or regulation, they have a tremendous track record in compelling whatever body is responsible to reverse the decision, PDQ. Remember that it was lobbying by banks, not by the government, that finally led to the collapse of the Glass-Steagall Act more than 60 years after it had been passed. If they could succeed in demolishing such a bedrock of financial regulation, could they really have been forced into acting against their best judgment by weaker, newer rules? It seems far more probable that these were rules they could live with or work around, or even rules that some of them believed would help make them more money.

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